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Abstract
The ability to estimate task difficulty is critical for many real-
world decisions such as setting appropriate goals for ourselves
or appreciating others’ accomplishments. Here we give a com-
putational account of how humans judge the difficulty of a
range of physical construction tasks (e.g., moving 10 loose
blocks from their initial configuration to their target configu-
ration, such as a vertical tower) by quantifying two key factors
that influence construction difficulty: physical effort and phys-
ical risk. Physical effort captures the minimal work needed
to transport all objects to their final positions, and is com-
puted using a hybrid task-and-motion planner. Physical risk
corresponds to stability of the structure, and is computed us-
ing noisy physics simulations to capture the costs for precision
(e.g., attention, coordination, fine motor movements) required
for success. We show that the full effort-risk model captures
human estimates of difficulty and construction time better than
either component alone.
Keywords: difficulty estimation; intuitive physics; physical
reasoning; hybrid task-and-motion planning
Introduction
Suppose two people are playing with blocks. Sally stacks
10 blocks to build a vertical tower (Figure 1, from 7-H-A
to 7-H-B), and Anne puts 10 blocks side by side to form a
horizontal line (Figure 1, from 7-E-A to 7-E-B). Which one
is harder to make? Even though both Sally and Anne worked
with the same number of blocks, we have the intuition that
Sally’s tower is harder to make than Anne’s horizontal line.
When prompted to explain why, you might note that Sally’s
tower is more likely to fall, so she might need to re-stack the
blocks, or be more careful than Anne when placing the blocks
so they don’t fall.
Intuitive judgments of task difficulty are ubiquitous in our
actions and decisions (Carroll, 1981). While as adults, we
rarely have to think seriously about the difficulty of build-
ing block structures, estimating task difficulty is critical for
efficiently navigating the physical and social world; for in-
stance, we often think about how difficult it would be to climb
a new route at the climbing gym, follow an unfamiliar recipe
for dinner, or finish a conference paper before the deadline
(Gweon, Asaba, & Bennett-Pierre, 2017).
Sometimes, our prior experience can give us a vague sense
for the difficulty of similar tasks (e.g., “making oatmeal is not
that hard”). However, judgments of difficulty often have to be
made before we actually engage in a task, and estimating task
difficulty is particularly important for tasks we’ve never com-
pleted before. For novel tasks, we might want to first evaluate
the probability of success to even decide whether to try that
task at all, set more reasonable goals, or decide whether ad-
ditional help is necessary (Gweon & Schulz, 2011). In these
cases, one must represent the current state of the world, the
desired goal state, and make a plan for how to get from the
initial state to the final goal state.
The explanations that we generate can sometimes provide
a useful glimpse into the underlying computations. As in the
example above, to explain why Sally’s tower is harder to build
than Anne’s line, we may allude to the physics behind the
building process (e.g., stability of the structures and the prob-
ability of falling over) and the nature of the actions required
to complete the task. Yet, it remains unclear whether these ex-
planations reflect the actual inferential processes that give rise
to people’s judgments. What representations and inferential
processes underlie our intuitive judgments of task difficulty?
Estimating difficulty
Difficulty is an abstract, unit-less construct that cannot be
measured on a single, absolute scale. Difficulty incorporates
both task-specific properties (e.g., Task A can be more dif-
ficult than Task B) and agent-specific attributes (e.g., a task
can be more difficult for Tom than for Suzy depending on
their competence). Difficulty can refer to both physical ef-
fort (e.g., force, work, time, fine motor control) as well as
mental effort (e.g., attention, cognitive control, inhibition, or
even requisite level of skill or intelligence). Even in making
seemingly simple inferences such as judging Sally’s tower as
harder to make than Anne’s line, people’s explanations of-
ten refer to both types of effort: Sally’s actions need to be
more precise (physical effort) and she needs a higher level of
concentration to correctly execute her plan (psychological ef-
fort). Unlike the height or weight of the structures that have
clear ground-truth values that can be measured in objective
units (e.g., 10 inches tall, 5 ounces in weight), the difficulty
of building a structure, while certainly related to its height or
weight, cannot be easily expressed as a single point estimate.
Nevertheless, there is reasonable consistency and system-
aticity in human observers’ estimates of task difficulty. Re-
cent work suggests that adults can provide difficulty estimates
that are tightly correlated with the time it takes to build a
structure, and that even preschool-aged children are quite ac-
curate at judging the relative difficulty of two block structures
similar to those shown in Figure 1 (Gweon et al., 2017). Crit-
ically, these judgments and estimates were made from sim-
ply looking at still photographs of the structures, rather than
having actually engaged in the building process. This sug-
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Figure 1: Experimental stimuli comprise 24 trials, each with an initial state (A) and final state (B). Trials are divided into 12
matched pairs, with one task that is intuitively easier and another harder, marked E, H respectively. (Note that E and H are
relative designations within a given pair of trials. A similar task may be easy in one pair and hard in another, e.g. pairs 7, 11.)
gests that even though difficulty may not have an objective
unit that cannot be directly measured, people use proxy mea-
sures like time or amount of work to communicate their in-
tuitions in some measurable format (e.g., this structure might
take 15 seconds to complete), and even use these estimates
to generate ad-hoc scales that allow them to express difficulty
in relative terms (e.g., Task X is more difficult than Task Y).
However, the cognitive mechanisms that support these com-
putations remain poorly understood.
Modeling difficulty
Here we give a computational account of these behaviors
by drawing on recent work in robotics and cognitive science.
We assume that the observer estimates both the physical effort
required to carry out an efficient plan as well as the physical
risk arising from the potential instability of the target con-
struction. We model physical effort as the total kinetic en-
ergy required to intervene on the world to change the cur-
rent state to the desired final state; we do this by using a hy-
brid task-and-motion planner that first finds a symbolic action
plan (e.g., pick, place, hold), and then translates this sym-
bolic plan into continuous motion trajectories of the agent’s
actions. We model physical risk using noisy physics simu-
lations to capture aspects of the construction process that go
beyond just transporting blocks from their initial to their fi-
nal positions. In the face of risk (i.e. potential physical in-
stability), our agent increases its motor precision to create a
more stable structure.There are a number of ways in which an
agent might increase precision; to minimize noise, an agent
might engage in fine motor control and coordination, or de-
ploy cognitive control or attention. All these efforts to ensure
appropriate level of precision is reflected in physical risk, a
probabilistic estimate of the stability of the final target state.
Recent work on intuitive physical reasoning suggests that hu-
mans have an “intuitive physics engine” (IPE) that allows
them to predict future physical states of the world by engag-
ing in mental simulation (Battaglia, Hamrick, & Tenenbaum,
2013; Gerstenberg, Zhou, Smith, & Tenenbaum, 2017). How-
ever, the focus of this prior work was primarily on explaining
how people predict the future states of the world in the ab-
sence of any agent interventions, such as judging whether a
block tower will fall given the weight of its components or
in which direction the tower is likely to fall. Yet, an internal
physics engine is also critical for action planning and object
manipulation. Indeed, most advanced object manipulation
systems in robotics combine both agent models and physics
(Todorov, 2018; Toussaint, 2015; Toussaint, Allen, Smith, &
Tenenbaum, 2018).
Imagine an agent in an “initial state” where 10 loose blocks
lie scattered on the floor (Fig. 1, 7-H-A). The agent could
perform the first intervention by picking up a block, mov-
ing it across the space, and placing it at a particular posi-
tion. The next action could involve picking up another one,
and placing it on top of the first one. By combining the IPE
with an intuitive understanding of goal-directed actions of an
agent, human observers can simulate forward the process of
building a block structure. Human observers can also reason
backwards from a representation of the final completed task
to estimate the number of actions, or the time that it took,
to build the tower (Gweon et al., 2017). Recent work sug-
gests that even children engage in physical problem solving
in ways that are similar to adults (Cortesa et al., 2018, 2017).
One intriguing possibility is that the kinds of proxy measures
that human subjects use intuitively (e.g., time to completion,
etc.) are generated from such process of physical simulation
conditioned on agent action.
Here we evaluate this hypothesis through computational
modeling. The process of building such block structures
lends itself well to precise formalization. The physical prin-
ciples involved in these block-building tasks are captured in
Newtonian mechanics (e.g., gravity, forces including sup-
port relations, motion). Existing physics engines can sim-
ulate these principles efficiently and realistically (Coumans,
2010), and are successfully utilized to explain aspects of hu-
man physical scene understanding as noted above (Battaglia
et al., 2013; Gerstenberg et al., 2017). Here, building on this
and other prior work (Yildirim, Gerstenberg, Saeed, Tous-
saint, & Tenenbaum, 2017), we focus on how IPE might be
deployed in our everyday reasoning about actions and their
consequences. More specifically, we use IPE model to es-
timate the physical risk (stability) of a given plan; we argue
that people’s intuitive estimates of task difficulty are rooted in
people’s abilities to engage in action planning by simulating
an agent’s goal-directed physical manipulation of objects.
Experiments: Estimated and actual difficulty
We collected data from human adults to characterize the
actual difficulty (measured in building time) of the block
structures as well as their estimates of expected building time
(in seconds) and estimates of difficulty (on an arbitrary scale).
Participants The data came from three separate tasks. 1)
Difficulty Estimation task: n = 59 (20 females), Mage =
31.62 (SD = 8.65); 2) Time Estimation task: n = 60 (23
females), Mage = 32.73 (8.72); and 3) Build Task: n = 20,
Mage = 18.75 (2.20). The Difficulty Estimation and Time
Estimation tasks were conducted on Amazon MTurk. Two
participants were excluded for providing identical responses
on all trials. The Build task was conducted in the lab (these
data were originally presented in Gweon et al., 2017).
Materials Photographs of 24 sets of structures made of 1-
inch wooden blocks were used (12 pairs, 1 easy and 1 hard
structure). There were two photographs for each structure:
“initial state” (for example, scattered blocks) and a “final
state” (for example, a 10 block vertical tower). On the screen
they were labeled “Start” and “Finish” respectively. The or-
der of presentation was randomized across 12 pairs and coun-
terbalanced within a each pair. We also used one particularly
“hard” and one particularly “easy” structure to help anchor
their subsequent judgments it the beginning of the task.
Procedure Depending on the task, participants used a sliding
scale to answer one of these questions for every trial: “How
difficult would it be to do this?” (Difficulty Estimation Task),
“How long would it take to make this?” (Time Estimation
Task). In order to account for differences in scale use between
participants, we z-scored each participant’s responses. For
the Build Task (in-lab), the experimenter laid out blocks in
front of the participant in the same configuration as the initial
photo on each trial, and asked the participant to create the
structure shown in the final state photo. We recorded how
long the subject spent building the block structure from start
to finish using a key press.
Model
The model consists of two components. The first compo-
nent evaluates the amount of physical effort that would be
required to change an initial spread of blocks on flat surface
(Initial State, or State “A”) to a particular target configuration
of blocks (Final State, or State “B”; see Fig.2). We define
physical effort as the total kinetic energy required to transport
all blocks to change the current state A to B. We derive this
quantity using a hybrid task-and-motion planner. This plan-
ner is based on the logic-geometric programming framework
and consists of an initial stage of symbolic action sequence
planning to go from A to B followed by trajectory optimiza-
tion to fulfill the symbolic plan with respect to a simulated
humanoid robot. The planner optimizes for a geometric cost
term consisting of the sum of squared accelerations.
The second component of the model captures the physical
risk – due to potential instabilities – involved in transitioning
from State A to B. For humans, these aspects might include
how much attention and motor precision is required to keep
the structure from falling during its intermediate stages. We
approximate these various facets of physical risk in a proba-
bilistic estimate of the stability of the target state B. We define
physical risk as how likely B is to fall, which we estimate by
aggregating the outcomes of multiple forward physics simu-
lations each starting from a configuration where the 3-D posi-
tion of each block in State B is perturbed with a small random
noise (cf. Battaglia et al., 2013).
Modeling physical effort
We model physical effort using a hybrid task-and-motion
planner – specifically, the logic-geometric programming
solver (Toussaint, 2015). Inputs to this planner are symbolic
representations of State A and State B. For each object (i.e.
a single block), the input representation specifies its dimen-
sions, position, and support relations (the list of other objects
supporting this object). Support relations across all objects
can be described in a simple directed graph, which we refer
to as a “support graph”, with nodes indicating objects and
edges indicating support relations.
Assignment of identities to objects within each symbolic
representation is arbitrary and identities across States A and
B need to be matched carefully. To illustrate, consider 11-E-
A and 11-E-B in Fig.1. All blocks appear identical and there
is no reason subjects or the model should assume a particular
assignment based on visual appearances of blocks. Instead,
in the model, we choose a one-to-one assignment of blocks in
State A to blocks in State B that minimizes the total Euclidean
distance between the initial and final positions of all blocks
while taking into account the blocks’ colors (e.g., a green
block in 11-H-A cannot be assigned to a yellow block in 11-
H-B). To find the mapping with a minimal total Euclidean
distance we use the Hungarian Algorithm (Kuhn, 1955).
Now given the representations of State A and State B and
the optimal mapping of objects from one state to the other, the
planner proceeds in two stages: 1) a symbolic planner and 2)
a geometric planner.
Symbolic planning In the first stage, a task planner gener-
ates a sequence of abstract actions to transform State A to
State B. In our setting, this is equivalent to finding an ordering
of blocks by which State B will be constructed from blocks
in State A. We find this ordering by exploiting the support
graph of state B. We find a sequence of actions that builds
state B from the ground up, making sure that each block to be
placed has its support already in place. Fig.2 shows one such
assignment of blocks for an example state pair and the re-
sulting symbolic plan by respecting the ordering arising from
the support graph of state B. For every block that needs to be
moved, we use two action primitives (implementing GRASP
and then PLACE actions with just a single hand of the robot).
The length of the plan ranged from 4 to 30 actions across the
Figure 2: Overview of the modeling approach. In step 1, the model chooses an assignment of objects from state A to B
minimizing the total Euclidean distance between initial and final 3D positions. In Step 2, the model finds a symbolic plan
that respects the support graph of State B. Two action primitives are sufficient to solve all of our trials, Grasp(Obj) and
Place(Obj1, Obj2). In Step 3, we perform trajectory optimization to find a full 3D path for each block to be transported from
an initial to a final position. Finally, in Step 4, we estimate stability (we define physical risk is as 1 - stability) by introducing
random but small amounts of perturbations to State B. Blue frames show stable runs, the red frame is unstable.
trials depending on the number of blocks that were needed to
be transported.
This symbolic plan does not take into account the geometry
of the shapes, or their rotations in space, and how they would
be transported by an efficient agent. Instead, it treats each
object as a point object that is supported by another point ob-
ject. The only relationships this planner respects are the sup-
port relations between objects. The distance between blocks
is implicitly taken into account due to the optimal assignment
of blocks as pairs prior to symbolic task planning.1
Geometric planning The second stage of the planner, the
geometric planner computes a full path in 3D for all objects
through trajectory optimization. The symbolic plan as well as
representations of State A and B are fed to the geometric plan-
ner, which uses the geometric information in the initial and fi-
nal state to create a set of constrained optimization problems.
The geometric planner finds the optimal movements that the
simulated humanoid robot must take to move the blocks ac-
cording to the sequence of moves in the symbolic plan. Fol-
lowing Yildirim et al. (2017), the planner minimizes squared
acceleration of the joints of the simulated humanoid robot us-
ing the KOMO (k-order motion-optimization) package intro-
duced in (Toussaint, 2015).
Measuring physical effort Physical effort is measured by
the kinetic energy needed to execute the resulting full plan.
Kinetic energy, 12 mv
2, requires knowing the velocity by which
the object is moved and its mass value for each step of the
symbolic plan. Velocity values are calculated from the geo-
metric planner by using the velocity with which the blocks
are being moved for each step of the symbolic plan while the
solution is being executed. Note that these velocity values re-
sult from the optimization procedure that minimizes the sum
of squared accelerations. We assume that the blocks are of
equal size and equal mass and assigned a unit mass to a unit
block. We obtain the total kinetic energy required to execute
a plan for a given pair of states A and B by summing up the
energy incurred by each step of the symbolic plan.
1Note we are separately handling distance and support relation.
Finding distance-minimizing pairs with respect to the topological or-
der in the support graph might yield more efficient possible solutions
in some cases.
We used M = 30 random samples to represent uncertainty
in the initial configurations that arises from the exact posi-
tions of scattered blocks (blocks that are not part of a clear
structure; or more specifically blocks that are laying on the ta-
ble without supporting any other block, e.g., all blocks in Fig.
1 5-E-A).2 This randomness in the initial configurations cre-
ates variation from simulation to simulation in how the blocks
are assigned between A and B, and what symbolic and geo-
metric solutions are generated. For a given pair A and B, we
calculate the total kinetic energy for each randomly drawn A,
and average across all 30 samples.
One trial (pair 12E and 12H in which blocks are placed in
a bucket) needed additional assumptions to solve. The plan-
ner is incapable of searching for specific blocks from a mix
of blocks in the box, or calculating paths that avoid passing
blocks through the box. Thus, we handled the initial con-
figurations in the following way: We lined up the 20 blocks
in a pre-specified order (a 10× 2 array) and randomly chose
which 5 should be colored blue for trial 12-E and which
should be colored red for trial 12-H (cf. Jara-Ettinger, Sun,
Schulz, & Tenenbaum, 2018). Like other trials, we solve and
obtain the total kinetic energy for each 30 such random initial
configurations, and then average across to obtain an estimate
of physical effort.
Modeling physical risk
We define the physical risk associated with a trial by how
likely its final configuration B is to fall. We estimate this
physical risk following Battaglia et al. (2013) by approximat-
ing a distribution over how robust the final configuration of
blocks B is to small perturbations of the blocks’ positions. We
ran N = 100 simulations and recorded whether or not the fi-
nal configuration remained stable after noise was applied. For
each sample, we modified B by randomly perturbing the po-
sition of each block in while ensuring that there is no overlap
between blocks (see Fig. 2 for example perturbed configura-
tions). The random perturbations for each block were drawn
2We did not systematically evaluate how the value of M would
impact our results. However, we noticed that the variation across
our 30 samples were not high to justify a bigger M, and it is possible
that even smaller values of M will produce very similar results as
reported here.
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Figure 3: Mean z-scored human judgments (large points con-
nected by solid lines) and fitted model results (small points
connected by dotted lines) with sigma = 0.065. The model
closely tracks human judgments in each task. It also captures
the easy vs. hard distinction in all pairs of easy (red) vs. hard
(blue) trials (e.g., 1e vs 1h) except for 11e vs. 11h. Error bars
show 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals.
i.i.d. from a Gaussian distribution with 0 mean and standard
deviation σ. Each perturbed configuration was simulated for-
ward using a physics engine (we used PhysX physics engine
in our simulations) either until all motion stopped or until a
given period of time elapsed3. We then estimated physical
risk of the target configuration B to be the fraction of simu-
lations where the tower fell relative to all N simulations. We
fitted σ to the data using a simple grid search exploring val-
ues between 0.05d to 0.1d with increments of 0.005d where
d is the length of the the block along the axis it is being per-
turbed (see beginning of the Results section for the details of
the fitting procedure).
The full model and lesioned models
We denote the estimated physical effort as Ei and the es-
timated physical risk as Ri where i indexes the trial number
across the 24 trials in our experiments (Fig. 1). Note that units
of Ei are in joules and non-negative, whereas Ri is a proba-
bility between 0 and 1. Our full model partitions Ei into two
factors based on Ri and fits a different coefficient for its risk
portion Ei×Ri and its risk-free portion Ei×(1−Ri) based on
the average human responses:
yi = β0 +β1Ei(1−Ri)+β2EiRi (1)
3To determine whether a tower fell, we simulated it starting from
its initial configuration for 4 seconds. If the difference between the
final and initial positions of any of the blocks is above a set thresh-
old, we considered that tower to have fallen.
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Figure 4: Comparisons of the full model, effort-only model,
and risk-only model. Filled circles show median correlation
values based on 1000 bootstrapped samples. Error bars show
the 2.5 and 97.5 percentile.
where yi denotes average human response for trial i and
β0,β1, and β2 are coefficients.
We compare the full model with lesioned models that only
consider the physical effort, or the physical risk. The physical
effort only model was fit using yi = β0 +β1Ei. The physical
risk only model was fit yi = β0 +β1Ri. Since we evaluate the
physical risk only model merely with respect to how well it
correlates with the data (see Fig. 4), fitting a slope and inter-
cept does not affect the results.
Results
In the full model, we estimated the noise parameter σ for
the physical risk estimation component of the model by fitting
the linear regression in Equation 1 for each dataset individu-
ally, and then exploring the root mean squared error (RMSE)
between model predictions and behavior. We set sigma to
0.065 (RMSE was higher for lower noise levels, and didn’t
change much for a range of levels). The full model which
combines effort and physical risk better captures the data than
the effort-only model (Figure 4).
Figure 3 shows the best fitting full model results against
the data at the trial-level granularity for each task. The
full model’s (combined physical effort and risk) predictions
closely tracked the data and are correlated highly with each of
the three tasks. Not only did the full model capture the overall
distribution of responses, it also recapitulated the easy versus
hard distinction in most trial pairs. The model produces the
correct rank order (assigning a smaller cost to the easy pair
than the hard pair) in a11 of the pairs. The only exception is
the pair 11E and 11H, where humans did not show any differ-
ence across all three datasets.
To what extent can we explain the behavior just using phys-
ical effort or just using physical risk? We correlated the pre-
dictions of the full model with participants’ judgments of
physical effort and physical risk and physical build times. We
obtained confidence intervals on the model’s correlation with
the data by bootstrapping over participants in each dataset.
We found that the fitted full model explained participants’
judgments behavior better than either of effort or risk in each
dataset. Interestingly, whereas in both the Estimated Time
and Build Time dataset the effort-only model better explained
behavior than the risk-only model (p < 0.05 direct bootstrap
hypothesis testing), in the Estimated Difficulty dataset the
risk-only model performed significantly better than the effort-
only model (p < 0.05 direct bootstrap hypothesis testing; Fig-
ure 4). To focus on the two judgment datasets, at the surface
level, the responses of the Estimate Time and Estimated Diffi-
culty participants are quite similar, and the full model indeed
correlates with each of them to a similar degree. However,
their responses appear to differentially correlate with the two
separate components of our model: the risk-only model corre-
lates better with the Estimated Difficulty dataset whereas the
effort-only model correlates better with the Estimated Time
dataset (in both comparisons p < 0.05, direct bootstrap hy-
pothesis testing; Figure 4). This suggests that participants
in these two groups might have attended to different features
or components of the reconfiguration problems. Participants
in the Estimated Difficulty experiment might have attended
more to how difficult it would be to keep the structure stable.
Participants in the Estimated Time experiment, on the other
hand, seemed to have weighted the overall distance that each
block would have to be moved to get from A to B in each pair,
which is captured by physical effort in our model.
Discussion
Intuitions about the difficulty of tasks are pervasive in
our everyday decisions and actions. Yet, the representations
and inferential processes that underlie these intuitions remain
poorly understood. The current work brings together ideas
and tools from cognitive science and robotics to formalize hu-
man adults’ judgments and estimates of difficulty in precise,
quantitative terms. Here we focused on people’s intuitions
about the difficulty of simple block-building tasks. We devel-
oped a novel computational model that quantifies the degree
of difficulty to transform an initial state of blocks into a final
target configuration. In doing so, our model takes into ac-
count not only the kinetic energy required to move blocks but
also the uncertainty in the stability of the structure introduced
by noisy placements of blocks. This model captures human
judgments well by considering physical effort and the level
of care required to achieve one’s goals in the physical world.
Even though both cost components were important to ac-
count for the data, the extent to which participants considered
each cost varied between tasks. We find that physical risk
(i.e. the level of care required) was particularly important for
people’s estimates of task difficulty, whereas considerations
of physical effort strongly affected people’s estimates about
how much time it would take to go from A to B.
The present study builds on Yildirim et al. (2017). The
models presented in both studies use the same solver for path-
planning (Toussaint, 2015) to accomplish trajectory optimiza-
tion in multi-step complex action sequences. However, the
present study differs from the previous work in two important
ways. First, we account for uncertainty arising from the spe-
cific way in which the blocks might be scattered in the initial
configuration. We also handle the mapping problem between
states A and B (i.e., a particular wooden block in state A can
go to one of many wooden blocks in state B) by choosing the
assignment that minimizes the total Euclidean distance be-
tween the assigned pairs. Second, our model treats the con-
tributions of physical risk (stability) and physical effort in-
dependently from each other whereas Yildirim et al. (2017)
integrated stability tests within the intermediate stages of the
geometric solver to filter out physically impossible plans. Our
choice of isolating risk from effort was not only computation-
ally more efficient but also allowed us to better understand
human judgments across different tasks.
The way in which our model evaluates and uses physical
risks to plan suggests a novel approach to functionally char-
acterize aspects of mental effort (Kool & Botvinick, 2018).
For example, when stacking blocks into a precarious config-
uration, we need to continuously attend to the task at hand,
and finely plan our motor actions. More generally, our model
emphasizes the role of internal object representations (e.g.,
shapes, positions, support relations, mass) as well internal
body models that can support thinking about complex object
manipulations. We see this intersection of physical reason-
ing, action planning, and difficulty estimation as a promis-
ing platform to formalize and reverse-engineer what compu-
tations are involved in the exertion of mental effort.
Interestingly, the model predictions showed relatively
worse fits with how long it actually took participants to solve
the different tasks compared to the estimated difficulty and
time judgments. It’s possible that people care about physi-
cal risk to different degrees at different points in the building
process – start more liberally but become more constrained
and focused at the end (to avoid an almost completed tower
from crashing). We can model a change in the level of care
depending on the current task at hand by having the planner
reason about the physical risk at each time step and then ac-
tively controlling the level of noise sigma as required.
Our current model assesses stability only once at the end,
without evaluating it in the intermediate stages throughout
the execution of a plan. Arguably this is different from how
a human planner would perform the task. While one might
consider this as a limitation of the model, for this particular
study, constraining the frequency of physical simulation was
not only computationally convenient but also informative: it
allowed us to straightforwardly determine the contributions of
effort and risk to explaining human judgments. Future work
should consider adaptive allocation of computation to esti-
mating stability throughout the intermediate stages of a plan
as described above.
In current work, the level of noise in physics simulations
was fit to the data. However, it would be interesting to try
and infer the level of noise directly from people’s actions.
Different people will differ in how carefully they execute
their actions, and in how skillful they are in interacting with
the physical world. Recent work in cognitive development
suggests that humans have representations of their own, as
well as others’ competence even early in life (Jara-Ettinger,
Gweon, Schulz, & Tenenbaum, 2016). These representa-
tions of competence can inform decisions about how to ef-
ficiently allocate tasks across agents (Magid, DePascale, &
Schulz, 2018), choose whom to help (Bennett-Pierre, Asaba,
& Gweon, 2018), learn from others’ effort (Leonard, Lee, &
Schulz, 2017), and even teach what would be too difficult for
others (Bridgers, Jara-Ettinger, & Gweon, 2016).
This study considered simple blocks-world type scenarios
as a “model organism” to characterize the computations that
support humans’ intuitively inferences about task difficulty.
One question is to what extent our current model can capture
human judgments across different tasks or scenarios outside
this domain. Although much further work is needed to cap-
ture people’s sense of difficulty in non-physics domains (e.g.,
navigating an unfamiliar environment, solving a math prob-
lem, learning a new skill), we believe that a range of tasks that
involve manipulation of physical objects could be modeled
using our approach by adjusting a few aspects of the sym-
bolic and geometric planner. Future work should explore how
our approach can be extended to different manipulation tasks
and to scenarios with more complex physics including objects
with different shapes, density, and substance properties (e.g.,
soft bodies, liquids).
We look forward to these lines of future work that will
help us better understand the inferential processes that un-
derlie these behaviors, and build better artificial agents that
can make these judgments in ways that humans do.
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